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In our society, one of the most cherished privileges is that of freedom of
speech, but even it often conflicts with many of our other privileges. Specifi-
cally, in the field of industrial relations, it has run up against the right of
freedom of association, which is the fundamental premise upon which our
Labour Codes are written. The potential conflict between these two freedoms
gives rise to the subject-matter of this paper, namely the issue of employer
free speech during organizational drives and decertification attempts. One
school of thought holds that an employer should be able to say anything, at
any time, under any circumstances. The opposite position holds that the right
of freedom of association is so very fragile that for it to have any practical
meaning employers must be completely silenced.
A number of specific arguments have been advanced in support of each
of these positions. First of all, those in favour of unfettered free speech
include:
(1) The employer is vitally interested in the welfare of his employees, and
hence the outcome of any event dealing with trade-union representation in-
volves him directly.
(2) The employees should be informed of all their legal rights, and the
employer is in a position to ensure that the union has not misinformed the
employees. In many cases, the employer is actually approached by the em-
ployees for this information.
(3) The employees have a right to all "the facts", and the employer
should be able to explain the economic consequences of unionization to the
employees in terms of competitive position, long-term growth and the firm's
continued existence. These consequences may in fact directly affect the
workers.
(4) The employer may truly distrust or fear unions and should be able to
express that opinion in a free society.
(5) The employer may fear that a union will not represent his employees
in a fair and just manner, and he should be able to communicate this concern
to the employees.
The arguments proposed in favour of restrictions on freedom of speech
are as follows:
(1) The employee is in such an economically dependent position that any
communication from the employer will have an impact far beyond its real
weight. Further, the more emotional the message, the greater the effect.
(2) The employee's right of association is totally beyond the concern of
the employer as it is essentially a question to be resolved between the em-
ployee and the union or unions involved.
(3) The employer has had an opportunity to communicate with the em-
ployee throughout the employment relationship. Any communication made
during an organization or decertification bid is more likely to consist either
directly or indirectly of threats, promises and the like rather than representa-
tions of reality.
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II. PROVISIONS OF THE LABOUR CODES
To begin this discussion of how these competing interests are handled,
the provisions of the Labour Codes in various jurisdictions in Canada must
be examined. The Codes are quite similar, and the Labour Relations Boards
have generally differed only in how strictly they have applied them, that is,
some Boards will interpret similar facts somewhat more harshly than others.
There are three types of restrictions that can be invoked under the
Codes during organizational campaigns. The first prohibits an employer from
doing anything that will intimidate or coerce an employee from becoming or
remaining a member of a union or from exercising any of his rights under a
Labour Code.' Second, the Codes also contain explicit prohibitions against
specific types of behaviour including, in relation to the question of free
speech, intimidation of the employees.2 The third prohibition is a general one
against interference with or participation in the formation or administration
of a trade-union.3
These restrictions are sometimes accompanied by a statement that the
Code does not intend to restrict the employer from any communication
whatsoever; in some statutes, statements of fact and reasoned opinion are
explicitly sanctioned.4 Even if a specific Code does contain such apparent
guarantees, however, the Boards still must wrestle with the boundaries to be
placed upon employer free speech in the context of a union's organizational
campaign.
III. THE RESTRICTIONS IN GENERAL
In general terms, the Boards have taken the position that any employer
activity, including speech, sets a dangerous precedent. The classic statement
of this doctrine was set out in the 1974 case of Forano Ltd.6 in which the
British Columbia Board indicated that due to the dependence of the employee
on the employer for his economic well-being, "[c]omments and predictions
which might seem innocuous in a political campaign take on a very different
hue when voiced by management."6 Therefore there is a great risk that any
statements made by management will be in contravention of the Code, and
thus the employer is admonished "to remain an interested bystander [and]
to resist the temptation to become an active partisan in a campaign against
a union."7 The Forano case also stands for the proposition that an employer
'Labour Code, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 212, ss. 3(3) (c), 5 [hereinafter B.C. Code];
Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 228, s. 70 [hereinafter Ont. Code]; Canada
Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, C. L-1, s. 186 (added by S.C. 1972, C-18, s. 1) [hereinafter
Federal Code].
2 R.C. Code, s. 3(3); Ont. Code, s. 64; Federal Code, s. 184.
3 B.C. Code, ss. 3(1), (3) (c); Ont. Code, ss. 64, 66; Federal Code, s. 184(1).
4 See text accompanying notes 64-75, infra.
5 (1974), 6 C.L.L.C. t 16,121 (Weiler).
6 ld. at 982.
7Id.
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cannot indicate any preference between unions which are competing for the
support of the employees.
In the Beechwood Const. Ltd.8 decision, the British Columbia Board
reiterated these basic sentiments and put a slightly different light on its
position.
As has been noted on many occasions in the context of employer free speech
arguments, the audience of employees is a captive one .and particularly vulner-
able to the overtones underlying such comments. Reasoned debate is precluded
by an appreciation of the employer's wishes and anticipation of the consequences
that may follow from exposing a viewpoint at odds with that position. That is
not free speech nor any form of debate which can assist an employee in making
an informed decision. That is why the legislative policy of the new Code is to
bar employer influence of any kind when employees are seeking certification. 9
[Emphasis added.]
The case indicates that in theory there is room for reasoned debate, but be-
cause of the employer's position and vested interest he must be precluded
from participating in that debate in any manner whatsoever.
Similarly, the Ontario Board has held that,
in view of the responsive nature of his relationship with his employer, and of
his natural desire to want to appear to identify himself with the interests and
wishes of his employer, an employee is obviously peculiarly vulnerable to in-
fluences, obvious or devious, which may operate to impair or destroy the free
exercise of his rights under the Act.'0
Although the Ontario Board has, at least historically, been more permissive
toward "harmless" employer participation, there have been recent indications
that a toughening of standards has occurred.
In the Winson Const. Ltd." case, the Ontario Board held that "[m]ere
interference by an employer in the selection of a trade union by employees
is sufficient to constitute an offence"'12 under section 56 of the Code. The
wording used by the Board seems to indicate that any interference whatso-
ever will be viewed unfavourably, but the facts of the case indicated that the
employer, by originating an opposing petition, did participate in such a way
that could be described as intimidation in any event.
Further, in the Dylex Ltd.'3 case, the Ontario Board held that an em-
ployer had contravened the Code through a combination of meetings, show-
case displays, posters and letters to the employees. There were references to
the lack of job security and to the possibility of the loss of benefits in a
negotiated contract. There was also the threat of a loss of employment should
a strike ensue. When all of these acts were viewed together, there was little
8 [1977] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 218, [1977] B.C.L.R.B. Decisions No. 32/77 (Baigent).
Old. at 228 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 24 (B.C.L.R.B.).
1oPiggott Motors (1961) Ltd. (1962), 63 C.L.L.C. 16,264 at 1130 (MacLean).
"1 [1977] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 138, [1976] O.L.R.B. Rep. 714 (Springate).
12 Id. at 143 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 719 (O.L.R.B.) [emphasis added].
13 [1977] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 171, [1977] O.L.R.B. Rep. 357 (Springate).
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doubt that employer interference had occurred. Finally in the Viceroy Const.
Ltd.14 case, after acknowledging the employer's dominant position due to his
freedom to advance, preserve, impede or terminate the employment of an
individual, the Ontario Board indicated that two employer letters and at-
tached clippings containing references to the possibility of lengthy strikes,
the unavailability of unemployment insurance, the potential loss of jobs, the
right of the employer to hire new employees and the possibility of plant
closure all combined to create an intimidating posture.
The landmark case under the federal statute is Taggart Service Ltd.15
In that case, the federal Board adopted the strict view of the Ontario Board
which had been expressed in the Sun Tube Ltd.-' and Wolverine Tube17
cases in the early 1960's:
An employer may express his views and give facts in appropriate manner and
circumstances on the issues involved in the representation proceedings in so far
as these directly affect him and has the right to make appropriate reply to propa-
ganda directed against him in relation thereto. However, he should bear in mind
in so doing the force and weight which such expression of views may have upon
the minds of his employees and which derive from the nature and extent of
his authority as employer over his employees .... He should take care that such
expressions of views do not constitute and may not reasonably be construed by
his employees to be an attempt by means of intimidation, threats, or other means
of coercion to interfere .... 
1 8
It is interesting to note that the federal Board in the Taggart decision
did not even mention the provisions of the Canadian Bill of Rights 9 which
had been enacted four years earlier. The provision relating to free speech was
finally mentioned in the 1975 Board decision of City and Country Radio
Ltd.20 In that case, the employer had often directly and indirectly indicated
his negative attitude toward unions. He had also addressed a "captive audi-
ence," dismissed a number of pro-union employees and circulated memos to
the employees. 2
1
In its reasons, the Board expressed the opinion that its decision in
Taggart had been the correct approach and that there was no incompatibility
between it and the provisions of the Canadian Bill of Rights. In its opinion,
section 184(1) (a) of the Labour Code of Canada "can be 'sensibly con-
strued and applied' so that it does not abrogate, abridge or infringe the
terms... of the Canadian Bill of Rights, that is, the freedom of speech of an
employer."2 The employer is free to express his opinions and give facts
"insofar as these directly affect him and to make appropriate reply to propa-
14 [1978] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 22, [1976] O.R.L.B. Rep. 562 (Springate).
15 (1964), 64(3) C.L.L.C. 16,015 (Brown).
16 [1962-63] O.L.R.B. Rep. 28.
17 (1963), 63 C.L.L.C. 16,296 (MacLean).
IsSupra note 15, at 687-88.
19 R.S.C. 1970, App. III (as am.), s. 1.
20 [1975] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 1, 75 C.L.L.C. 16,171 (Lapointe).
21 Id.
221d. at 7 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 1263 (C.L.L.C.).
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ganda directed against him ... .,"23 This defence, however, must not turn into
uncalled-for intervention or interference.
The federal Board has indicated subsequently that the employer may
also "accurately publicize the existing terms and conditions of employment
[b]ut... must not make or imply any promises.... " 24 The Board seems to
perqeive the employer's role as one of a purveyor of facts; however, the
instant that interpretation or prediction appears in his comments or actions,
the employer has undoubtedly overstepped the boundaries of the Code. In
conclusion, it seems that over the last five years, there has developed a
common ground that if there is any freedom of speech in Canada in relation
to union organizing campaigns, it is certainly restricted to very innocuous
mutterings (although it can be argued that the federal Board is more forgiv-
ing of "slight" indiscretions).
IV. SPECIFIC TYPES OF PROHIBITED BEHAVIOUR
It has become trite to observe that each case is different but that caveat
is critical here. Often, one type of behaviour is accompanied by other acts.
In some cases it was prohibited, but if it had been done in isolation or even
in different circumstances, it is conceivable that it would have been per-
missible.
A. Harassment, Intimidation and Surveillance
Intimidation and harassment at work to the point that an employee quits
his job constitutes a violation of the Code and is tantamount to a dismissal.
25
Similarly, any aggressive behaviour and undisciplined comments that have
the effect of making an employee feel he is being intimidated or harassed
are strictly prohibited as, for example, where a manager screamed and yelled
at an employee and continually broke promises he had made to her.2 6
Inflexibility or intransigence on the part of the employer will also con-
stitute intimidation under some circumstances. The British Columbia Board
found this unfair labour practice in the Robinson Little Ltd.27 case where
the employer reacted to the union's organizational attempts with sarcasm,
censure, heavy-handed tactics, continuous criticism, increased job surveil-
lance and invitations to the staff to his home.28 Close surveillance of the
conversations and activities of union organizers may also constitute coercion.
29
23 Id. at 7 (Can. L.R.B.R.), 1264 (C.L.L.C.).
24Bank of Nova Scotia, Selkirk Branch, [1978] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 544 at 551
(Dorsey).
25 Fairmont Hot Springs Resort, [1975] B.C.L.R.B. Decisions No. 56/75 (Morri-
son), [1976] B.C.L.R.B. Decisions No. 64/76 (Morrison)
2GReddi Gas Propane Ltd., [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 544, [1974] B.C.L.R.B. Deci-
sions No. 33/74 (Peck), [1974] B.C.L.R.B. Decisions No. 112/74 (Moore).
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B. Promises of Improved Conditions of Employment
An indication from the employer that future negotiations will be much
easier if the union does not get certified, has been held to violate various
Codes.30 Promises of stock options3' or increased wages32 are similarly pro-
hibited. In fact, merely calling a meeting to discuss potential improvements
in the conditions of employment has been held to be an unfair labour
practice.33
C. Threats of Reprisal
Threats to discontinue operations,34 to declare bankruptcy or to move
a plant to another location35 have been held to be coercive and intimidating
as well as undoubtedly constituting general interference. The mere fact that
the threats are veiled and can only be discovered after a careful analysis of
what was said will not excuse the employer.30 In the Viceroy37 case, the
Ontario Board noted:
Fire, flood and other external conditions may also cause plants to close, but the
employer has chosen to put before the eyes of its employees the example of a
plant closing for the alleged purpose of destroying a union. The resulting sug-
gestion, however factual, that some employers are prepared to destroy employees'
jobs in order to destroy their union is an object lesson not wasted on employees
of normal sensitivity. It is a statement by example that could reasonably be
perceived by the employees as a clear threat to their jobs.3 8
The Boards in dealing with the free speech provisions have not attempted
to draw distinctions between the meanings of threat and intimidation. It is
sufficient to observe that there is considerable overlap between the two.
Other types of prohibited economic threats include threats of lay-offs,3a
shorter working hours40 or the loss of job security or-other benefits. 41
D. Interrogation of Employees
One of the most interesting areas related to the question of employer
free speech is the issue of whether an employer is able to make inquiries of
3 OMcCoy Bros. Ltd., [1977] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 450, [1977] B.C.L.R.B. Decisions
No. 9/77 (Munroe).
3 lSupra note 25.
32 Cam Chain Ltd., [1975] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 187, [1974] B.C.L.R.B. Decisions No.
138/74 (Moore); Gestetner (Canada) Ltd., [1971] O.L.R.B. Rep. 62 (Egan); Hostess
Food Prod. Ltd., 75 C.L.L.C. 16,175, [1975] O.L.R.B. Rep. 218 (Boscariol); J..
Martel & Sons Lumber Ltd., [1972] O.L.R.B. Rep. 811 (Boscariol); Seven-Up (Ontario)
Ltd., [1970] O.L.R.B. Rep. 198 (O'Shea).
33 Supra note 8.
34 Supra note 30.
35 Cam Chain, supra note 32.
36 Bell & Howell Canada Ltd., [1968-69] O.L.R.B. Rep. 695 (Brown); Kernohan
Lumber & Sash Ltd., [1977] O.L.R.B. Rep. 676 (Davis).
3 7 Supra note 14.
38 1d. at 27 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
39 General Mills (Canada) Ltd., File No. 7411-74-R (Ont.); Mink-Dayton Inc.
(1967), 166 N.L.R.B. 604 (McCulloch, U.S.).
40 Mink-Dayton, id.
4 1 Supra notes 15-17.
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his employees concerning the events of an organizational campaign. If the
surrounding circumstances are such that the questioning amounts to coercion
or intimidation, the Boards will intervene.42 In the British Columbia case of
Bulkley Valley Forest Ltd.,43 the manager called two employees into his
office and questioned them extensively concerning the union's activities. It
was felt that this was an overt act which gave the appearance of opposition
to the union organizing activity and should be prohibited. 44 Similarly, where
an employer visited an employee at his home and the employee then sub-
mitted his resignation from the union, it was concluded that the interrogation
had obviously intimidated the employee. 45 It appears that there may be room
for an innocent question of an employee about what generally is happening
but any direct questions concerning his own opinions or membership status
will lead the Board to conclude that the employer is interfering.46
E. Institution of a Petition
While strictly not part of the free speech question, the circulation of a
petition that solicits anti-union support by an employer borders on expression
of opinion and hence will be treated here. Employers should not become
active participants in the solicitation of employee dissatisfaction. 47 Obviously,
if the employees are intimidated or coerced into signing, there is a violation.
The mere fact that an employer is aware that a petition is being circulated
by a group of employees and does nothing to stop it, however, is not an
unfair labour practice.48
In some earlier Ontario cases, management's participation in the circu-
lation of a petition was found merely to undermine the purpose of the peti-
tion rather than to constitute an unfair labour practice itself. Thus, a petition
requesting a vote, even though a majority of employees had signed union
cards, would be rejected because of management's participation. 49 Recently
however, the Ontario Board seems to have taken a stronger stand. In the
Winson case, it was held that employer involvement in the origination,
preparation or circulation of a petition itself constituted an unfair labour
practice.50
42 Supra note 16; Bank of Montreal, Tweed Branch, [1978] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 123,
26 Di 591 (Dorsey, Can.).
43 [1976] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 453, [1976] B.C.L.R.B. Decisions No. 17/76 (Peck).
441d. at 456 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
45Kidd Bros. Produce, [1976] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 304, B.C.L.R.B. Decisions No.
53/76 (Moore).
46 Cam Chain, supra note 32.
47 Supra note 5, at 988; Langley Advance Publishing Co., [1974] B.C.L.R.B. Deci-
sions No. 139/74 (Weiler).
48 Quadra Mfg. Inc., [1974] B.C.L.R.B. Decisions No. 97/74 (Moore).
49 Rubbermaid (Canada) Ltd., [1967-68] O.L.R.B. Rep. 336 (O'Shea); New Ontario
Dynamics Ltd., [1975-76] O.L.R.B. Rep. 845 (Adams).
50 Supra note 11.
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F. The Holding of a Meeting
This is one instance in which there seems to be a significant difference
among the Boards. In British Columbia, a meeting to discuss union organiz-
ing has, in and of itself, been held to contravene the Code regardless of the
content of the statements made. The Board seems to view the mere presence
of management as interference and, in most cases, also coercive.r 1
In some jurisdictions, the Boards seem to prefer to deal with the efleets
of the meeting. Anything which results from such an event is viewed with
great suspicion; for example, the Boards will often dismiss employee petitions
that originate following a meeting with management. 2 In New Ontario
Dynamics,53 the Ontario Board noted that:
such meetings convey the anti-union sentiments of the management regard-
less of their content and, because of this, tend to taint the following efforts of
employees who decide to oppose the application. In fact the very formality of
holding such meetings demonstrates an employer's concern, and may, in the eyes
of other employees, align with management those employees subsequently cir-
culating a petition.54
Of course, the repeated use of the "captive audience" technique when com-
bined with other coercive practices will constitute an unfair labour practice."
In a case where a meeting is held, but the Board is convinced there really
was no pressure on employees to attend, the employer may be on safe
ground.56 It may be difficult to convince the Board that the employees
actually had a legitimate choice, however. The Nova Scotia Board in the
now-famous Michelin Tire57 case has adopted the position that an employer
is free to express his views at meetings unless they actually constitute threats
or undue influence.
The federal Board will review both the context and content of the meet-
ing, but it appears that it automatically takes a very dim view of the use of
the captive audience technique. In the City and Country Radio5 8 case, con-
cem was expressed over the fact that the employee does not have the option
of "turning off" the employer. Therefore, when a meeting is combined with
any other suspicious behaviour, there is likely to be a finding of an unfair
labour practice. During the last couple of years, the federal Board has had to
wrestle with this specific problem during the organizational drives in the
banks; in a number of these cases, it has found violations of the Code.50
5 lSupra note 25.
52Bulk-Lift Systems Ltd., [1960-61] O.L.R.B. Rep. 431; Travelaire Trailer Ltd.,
[1970] O.L.R.B. Rep. 829 (Brown); Hayes Steel Prod. Ltd., [1964] O.L.R.B. Rep. 30.
5 Supra note 49.
54 ld. at 851.
55 Supra note 16; see also Savage Shoes Ltd. (1960), 60 C.L.L.C. 16,178 (Reed,
Ont.).
56 Greb Ind., [1979] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 56 (Furness, Ont.).
57 Michelin Tires (Canada) Ltd., [1979] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 388 (Christie).
5s Supra note 20.
5 9 See, e.g., Bank of Montreal, Tweed, supra note 42; Bank Canadian National,
File 745-357, Decision No. 189 (Foissy).
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G. Time Restrictions
In Ontario, the rights of the employer (and the union) are further re-
stricted during a period immediately preceding the representation vote. The
Ontario Board has the power (and usually uses it) to direct that even inno-
cent communication cannot occur for a seventy-two hour period immediately
before the vote. This prohibition is virtually absolute and any violation of it,
regardless of the quality or the likely effect of the communication, may bring
severe penalties (such as the holding of a new vote). 6° In cases where the
rule has been broken accidentally (for example, where mail was delayed
unexpectedly), the Board may overlook the violation if in its opinion, no
serious harm was done. There is, however, a heavy onus on the violator to
prove that it was accidental and that it did not have serious repercussions. 6'
In the United States, there is a similar restriction known as the Peerless
Plywood 2 rule. The rule explicitly establishes that "employers and unions
alike will be prohibited from making election speeches on company time to
massed assemblies of employees within twenty-four hours before the sched-
uled time for conducting an election. Violation of this rule will cause the
election to be set aside whenever valid objections are filed."' The effect of
this type of prohibition is to limit last minute assaults when the other side is
denied a full opportunity to contest the points made. It is certainly a useful
device but does not really solve the major questions in this area.
V. THE PERMISSIVE SECTIONS
As noted previously, some Codes contain provisions that seem to open
the door for some type of employer involvement. Section 56 of the Ontario
Code, for example, contains a clause which expressly guarantees the em-
ployer's right of free speech provided that it does not amount to coercion,
intimidation, threat, promises or undue influence. The Ontario cases pre-
viously examined all were decided in the face of this provision. Its impact
on the Board seemed greater in the years prior to 1975. In that period the
Board seemed more willing to allow some degree of politicking. The test
employed in deciding whether there had been a section 56 violation was
whether the employer's statements would be considered by the average em-
ployee in the context that they were made as ordinary electioneering propa-
ganda or whether they would impede his ability to express his true wishes,
which would destroy the effect of a representation vote.' The Board had
60 See Warkenhut of Canada Ltd., [1975-76] O.L.R.B. Rep. 738 (Armstrong);
Automatic Electric (Canada) Ltd. (1961), 61 C.L.L.C. 16,226 (Finkelman).
01 See Hostess Food, supra note 32; Waterloo County Health Ass'n, [1965-66]
O.L.R.B. Rep. 121; Windsor Telephone Answering Service, [1973] O.L.R.B. Rep. 460
(Brown); Automatic Electric, id.; Komoka Nursing Homes Ltd., [1973] O.L.R.B. Rep.
28 (O'Shea); Kralinator Filters Ltd., [1966-67] O.L.R.B. Rep. 312 (Egan); XDG Ltd.,
[1975-76] O.L.R.B. Rep. 936 (Furness).
62Peerless Plywood Co. (1953), 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (Farmer); see also Mallory
Capacitor Co. (1967), 167 N.L.R.B. 647 (Fanning, U.S.).
03 Peerless Plywood, id. at 429 [emphasis added].
64Stauffer-Dobbie Ltd. (1959), [1949-59] 1 C.L.L.C. t 18,147 (Finkleman).
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indicated that it would give the employer some lee-way, for it did not wish
to "police election campaigns or to consider the truth or falsity of campaign
literature or speeches unless the ability of the employees to evaluate such
literature or speeches is impaired." 65 In one case, the employer sent two
letters to the employees, but these did not contain what could be considered
coercive statements. The Board held that in the absence of any intimidation,
it would not police or censor propaganda; that was the task of the opposing
party. Exaggeration, inaccuracies, partial truth, name-calling and falsehoods
may be excused as legitimate election tactics as long as they are not so mis-
leading as to prevent the exercise of the employees' free choice; 0 employees
must be credited with a modicum of common sense.67 From more recent
decisions, however, it would appear that the Ontario Board is now more
likely to prohibit propaganda campaigns although an employer is still entitled
to express his views and is not confined to mere platitudes.08
In British Columbia, the original Labour Code enacted by the New
Democratic Party government in 1973 did not contain any such permissive
provision. The Social Credit government amended the Code in 1977; the
changes included section 3 (2):
Nothing in the Act shall be so interpreted as to limit or otherwise affect the
right of the employer... (g) to communicate to an employee a statement of
fact or opinion reasonably held with respect to the employer's business .... 69
The industrial relations community anxiously awaited an indication from the
Board as to whether this amendment would require a change in the Board's
approach but that opinion was not quickly forthcoming. The Board did use
the section as a further basis for permitting direct employer contact with
employees during negotiations,70 but it had already permitted this in the
absence of this section.
71
In April, 1980, the Board finally was faced with the issue in the Delta
Optimist72 case. The source of the complaint was a number of activities
carried out by the publisher of a newspaper. First of all, he asked three
employees whether there was a union drive occurring and then specifically
whether each of them had joined. Second, he called a meeting of the staff
during working hours, addressed the employees for several minutes and pro-
duced a document opposing union representation for the employees to sign
if they wished. Finally, following the meeting, he asked specific individuals
8 Id. at 1790.
66 Alcan Bldg. Ltd., [1971] O.L.R.B. Rep. 806 (O'Shea).
87id. at 808; see also Savage Shoes, supra note 55; supra note 64.
Os Supra note 56.
09 Labour Code of British Columbia Amendment Act, 1977, S.B.C. 1977, c. 72,
s. 2 substituting and repealing s. 3(2) of the Labour Code of British Columbia, S.B.C.
1973 (2nd Sess.), c. 122. The current B.C. Code contains a substantially similar pro-
vision [s. 3(3) (g)].
70 B.C. Sugar Refining Co., [1978] B.C.L.R.B. Decisions No. 49/78 (Weiler).
71 Insurance Corp. of B.C., [1978] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 53, [1977] B.C.L.R.B. Deci-
sions No. 59177 (Peck).
72 [1980] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 227, [1980] B.C.L.R.B. Decisions No. 26/80 (Germaine).
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to sign. Subsequently, some of the employees were dismissed. After failing
to solve the issue through the use of informal hearings, the British Columbia
Board issued a formal decision in which it reviewed previous decisions and
dealt with the amendment. The employer claimed that three of his remarks
were protected by this section; these statements were to the effect:
(1) that he was grateful for the loyalty of the employees who informed
him of the union's efforts;
(2) that if the union was successful he might have to lay off employees;
and
(3) that he had earlier refused an offer to buy the business because the
firm making the offer had purchased another suburban newspaper and had
then closed its printing shop.
The Board torpedoed these arguments. First of all, it held that the rights
set out in what was then section 3(2) (g) "were not intended to reduce or im-
pair the scope of the prohibitions against a wide variety of unfair labour
practices." 73 Second, where a statement of fact is coercive, the "protection
afforded an employer by section 3(2) (g) must depend, therefore, upon the
context in which the facts are communicated and, given that context, the
probable impact of those communications." 74
In the result, the employer was found guilty of coercion on all counts:
[We conclude that in relating this information in the context of the other state-
ments made at the meeting, it was Bexley's purpose to induce the employees to
abandon their support of the Union.... Bexley's purpose in calling the meeting
and in making the statements he did, including his reference to an unsuccessful
offer to purchase the Optimist, is established by the content of the document
Bexley asked the employees to sign. Rather than merely indicating that the signa-
tories had not joined any union (which was Bexley's stated purpose in request-
ing the signatures), the document went on to indicate that the signatories did
not want union representation....
Nor is there any doubt about the intimidatory character of this meeting. A
number of Union witnesses testified that they were frightened, felt pressured and
were concerned about the future of the Optimist and their employment as a
result of the sentiments expressed by Bexley during the meeting....
Bexley approached the three typesetters and he did so by pointing a
finger at each of them individually and demanding in an agitated manner wheth-
er they were going to -sign the petition.... [S]uch conduct, including as it did
physical gestures to emphasize his request that the employees sign a document
opposing the Union, must also be recognized as coercive and as reasonably
having the effect of influencing an employee to refrain from supporting a trade-
union.75
Therefore, it appears on the basis of this decision that any hope inspired by
the SoCred amendment in the hearts of employer free speech proponents was
premature, to say the least. Ironically, the federal Board, which seems to
have been the most permissive of the large Boards, does not have in its
legislative mandate any express statement of employer's rights.
73 Id. at 238 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 239 (Can. L.R.B.R.).
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VI. DECERTIFICATION APPLICATIONS
In order to complete the discussion of employer free speech in the case
of union organizing drives, the issue of decertification applications must be
addressed. It is safe to say that the Boards are even more restrictive towards
employers when it comes to activity that can be viewed as encouraging em-
ployees to remove an existing trade-union certification. In some jurisdictions
the Board is not bound even by a vote of the employees if it feels there has
been employer interference.7 6 In other jurisdictions the vote is binding but
before the Board orders the decertification vote, it must determine whether
the application petitions were "voluntarily signed". 77 This gives the Board
the leverage it needs to prevent undesirable interference.
As with unfair labour practices during organizational campaigns, each
case relating to decertifications is different. It is, however, useful to look at
some of the typical behaviour that would likely be in violation of the various
Codes in the country. The key ingredient is, once again, the necessity of get-
ting at the true w'ishes of the employees.78 Any activity which is viewed as an
invitation to the employees from the employer to abandon the union is un-
acceptable.70 This would include:
(1) a strong speech against the union to a captive audience delivered by a
principal of the company; 80
(2) the circulation with management approval (even if tacit) of the de-
certification petition on company premises during working hours;81
(3) an implication by the employer that the presence of the union is pre-
venting an imminent wage increase;
2
(4) the clandestine interrogation of the employees by the employer or his
agent;
83
(5) a continuing refusal to bargain in good faith with the union which
leads to discontent among the rank and file;8
76 E.g., British Columbia.
7 7 E.g., Ontario.
78 See, for instance, International Union of Doll & Toy Workers of the US.A.
and Canada, Local 905, [1977] O.L.R.B. Rep. 534 (Springate); Westinghouse Canada
Ltd., [1977] O.L.R.B. Rep. 651 (Springate); J.A.K. Electrical Contractors Ltd., [1977]
O.L.R.B. Rep. 275 (Burkett); N-I Spivak Ltd., [1977] O.L.R.B. Rep. 462 (Burkett);
CCH Canadian Ltd., 77 C.L.L.C. 16,094, [1977] O.L.R.B. Rep. 346 (Picher); Arm-
bro Materials & Const. Ltd., [1976] O.L.R.B. Rep. 743 (Picher); Bentley's Sporting
Goods Ltd. (1959), 59 C.L.L.C. 18,129 (Finkelman, Ont.).
79 Peel Block Ltd. (1963), 63 C.L.L.C. 16,277 (MacLean, Ont.).
80 Mitten Ind. Gait Ltd., [1975-76] O.L.R.B. Rep. 154 (Carter).
81 CJ.R.P. Radio Provinciale Ltie, [1977] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 238 (LeBel, Can.).
82Dominion Directory Ltd., [1975] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 345, [1975] B.C.L.R.B. Deci-
sions No. 65/75 (Baigent).
83 Kootenay Savings Credit Union, [1978] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 40, [1977] B.C.L.R.B.
Decisions No. 54/77 (Peck).
84 Supra notes 45, 82; Imperial Optical Ltd., [1976] B.C.L.R.B. Decisions No.
67/76 (Morrison).
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(6) the use by the dissident employees of counsel who normally acts for
the employers;85
(7) the payment by the employer of some of the expenses incurred by the
group of employees seeking decertification;86
(8) the attendance by the employer or senior management at a meeting of
the employees called to discuss the decertification issue, 7 particularly if they
explicitly attempt to persuade the employees to resign from the union;88
(9) the alteration of the company's payroll by including employees of a
non-union company on the payroll of the union company to increase the base
for a decertification petition;89
(10) apparent favouritism shown by management to employees who were
known to be anti-union by dealing with them outside the terms of the collec-
tive agreement; this could include the payment of higher wages, better work-
ing conditions, or promises of advancement;90
(11) the creation of impediments to frustrate the union's attempts to
communicate with the employees;91 and
(12) the submission of many of the employees' letters of resignation 2 or
the petition itself directly to the management93 or Board of Directors.94
In conclusion, it must be noted that the Boards will not dismiss applica-
tions purely to punish the employer for his indiscretions where there is vir-
tually no support left among the membership. 95 Unions do not have a
property right in their certifications,96 but the Boards have nevertheless re-
peatedly given employers a very strong and clear sign that their participation
in decertification drives is most unwanted.
VII. REMEDIES
The various Boards have used a number of remedies to combat em-
ployer interference in union affairs. The first is of course the cease and
85 Wilson-Munroe Co., [1976] O.L.R.B. Rep. 385 (Boscariol); London Drugs Ltd.,
[1974] B.C.L.R.B. Decisions No. 149/74 (Moore).
86 London Drugs, id.; Imperial, supra note 84.
87 Id.
88 Supra note 81.
89 Western Steak Restaurants Ltd., [1974] B.C.L.R.B. Decisions No. 124/74
(Moore).
90 Imperial, supra note 84.
01Id.
92 Supra note 81.
93 Genwood Ind. Ltd., [1976] O.L.R.B. Rep. 417 (Picher).
94 York Condominium Corp. No. 77, [1977] O.L.R.B. Rep. 643 (Picher).
95 Labour Relations Bd. of Saskatchewan v. The Queen, [1956] S.C.R. 82, [1955]
5 D.L.R. 607, aff'g [1954] 4 D.L.R. 359, 13 W.W.R. (N.S.) 1, 19 C.R. 308 (Sask.
C.A.); Fine Arts Dental Laboratories Ltd., [1977] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 161, B.C.L.R.B.
Decisions No. 20/77 (Bone); Dominion Directory Ltd., supra note 82.
96 1mperial Oil Ltd., [1977] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 243 at 247, B.C.L.R.B. Decisions
No. 45/77 at 9 (Moore).
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desist order. Unfortunately, these orders are effective only in limited circum-
stances. If an employer has knowingly or flagrantly violated the Code, it is
questionable how much impact a cease and desist order would have on him.
He may either be willing to take his chances with the Board in order to
attempt to beat the union for financial reasons or because of his personal
distaste for unions. In these cases the order probably has very little deterrent
value. Further, an employer who is willing to face the wrath of the Board
could engage in a campaign that is characterized by suddenness and brevity.
In many cases, this would be the most effective type of campaign; to dis-
courage this type of behaviour the Board must have other remedies available
under the Code. This remedy is a post facto mechanism to abort existing
violations and is most useful against innocent but erring employers. Where
there are continuous breaches of the Code, it would be necessary for the
union to return to the Board and seek other remedies.
Another method of countering employer involvement is to order a rep-
resentation vote in circumstances where on the face of it the union does not
have a sufficient number of cards. The holding of a vote is predicated on
the assumption that the effects of the employer's practices have disappeared,
so that the employees will feel they can honestly express their free will. The
more serious and intimidating the behaviour of the employer, the longer it
will have an effect on the minds of the workers. It does seem reasonable
to conclude that the longer the period between votes, the more likely it is
that the coercion will have become remote. This time delay may, however,
work to the employer's advantage in that the union organizers may lose in-
terest, the pro-union workers may leave (with management's blessing) or
the entire issue of union representation may lose its appeal.
Many Boards possess the power "to rectify" any acts that have violated
the Code. These provisions offer a great deal of latitude to the Boards and
have been employed to allow the union to address the employees on the
company premises, to hand out literature at the meeting and to return one
more time before the vote to distribute further information. 97 This rectifica-
tion power has also been used to award monetary damages,0 8 to require the
employer to deliver a complete list of the names, addresses and telephone
numbers of the employees to the union 9 and to issue a "make-whole"
remedy. 100 This puts the union in the position it would have been in had the
unfair labour practices not occurred.
97Supra note 5, at 985; supra note 72; Radio Shack, [1980] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 99;
80 C.L.L.C. 16,003 (Adams, Ont.).
98 But only where other remedial orders would be ineffective or disobeyed; CLRA
v. 1BEW, [1977] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 203, [1976] B.C.L.R.B. Decisions No. 75/76 (Munroe).
99 British Columbia Ry., [1976] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 470, [1976] B.C.L.R.B. Decisions
No. 20/76 (Weiler). It should be noted that this case was decided under an earlier
version of s. 4 of the B.C. Code, S.B.C. 1973, c. 122 (as am. by S.B.C. 1974-75, c.
33, s. 3) which expressly authorized this remedy. It is suggested, however, that this
remedy could still be used under s. 8(4) (b) of the present B.C. Code, R.S.B.C., 1979,
c. 212, and this case could offer guidance as to when the remedy would be appropriate.
100 See, supra notes 27 and 45 for a discussion of when these orders are appropriate.
It should be noted that these cases both involved more than the exercise of the right
of free speech.
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One of the most severe and effective disincentives to the commission
of unfair labour practices would be to automatically certify the union, thus
removing the benefits of this unlawful conduct. This remedy, if used indis-
criminately, however, could result in certifying unions in places where the
employees really do not want them. Therefore, the Boards that do possess
this remedy have been hesitant to use it except in cases where there was a
real organizing momentum built up and it was likely that the union would
have obtained a majority in the absence of the employer interference.' 0 '
VIII. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The major objective in this area of labour law is to strike a balance
between the right of the employer to express his opinions and the right of the
employees to organize without undue employer influence. There is particular
concern about the "emotional" impact of any communication from the em-
ployer because this is the factor which ordinarily interferes with the exercise
of a free and enlightened choice by the employee. A number of restrictions
designed to lessen that impact are in place in some jurisdictions and there
are others which the writer feels should be considered.
A. Restrictions on the Use of the "Captive Audience" Technique
A captive audience is normally a very receptive one, for whatever rea-
son, be it interest, fear or a combination of the two. The Board's choices in
this area are essentially to continue to view this technique as inherently
coercive and intimidating or to permit its use in limited circumstances. For
example, if a company did wish to address its workers, it would have to
provide equal time for the union to do so. It would seem that the latter
approach, which is occasionally used in the United States, would not fit into
the overall framework of industrial relations in Canada. The legislation, both
federal and provincial, tends to avoid confrontation politics whenever pos-
sible, and the use of organized confrontations seems to be inimical to the
philosophical underpinnings of the Codes in Canada.
Another approach, which to some degree faces the same problems, is to
restrict an employer's communication about an organizational campaign to a
"controlled meeting". If the employer wished to express his opinions, he
could request the Board to call and supervise a meeting at which both
management and the union could address the employees concerning the
benefits and disadvantages of unionization. Perhaps, in such a setting, there
would be less potential for coercive and intimidating behaviour, than in an
open meeting.
There are a number of obvious problems with this approach. First of
all, it would be a very time-consuming chore, and the Boards have enough
to do. Even if the budget could be found to supply the manpower, this forum
101 Robin Hood Multifoods Ltd., [1976] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 206, [1976] O.L.R.B.
Rep. 250 (Kates); Connors Bros. Ltd., [1980] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 318 (Harrington, N.S.);
Smith Beverages Ltd., [1974] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 289, [1975] O.L.R.B. Rep. 956 (Burkett);
Consumer Pallet Ltd., 74 C.L.L.C. 16,129, [1974] B.C.L.R.B. Decisions No. 37/74
(Peck); Cam Chain, supra note 32; supra notes 5, 8, 11.
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could offer the parties a chance to see "what they could get away with" with
the result that the very thing that is to be prevented would actually be en-
couraged. Furthermore, although the Board would have a better "feel" for
the circumstances of the communication, the actual decision as to whether
certain statements actually contravened the Code would still be most difficult.
B. Written Submissions
If there is to be communication of any sort, one of the most reasonable
and practical solutions would be for the Board to restrict communication to
written submissions either by way of letter or public notice. In that way,
much of the emotional impact that accompanies these interpersonal opinions
would be diffused. Employers who merely wish to "give the employees the
facts" should not be adverse to this suggestion. In this way, any reasonable
facts and opinions could be expressed with a clear conscience, the employee
would be exposed to "both sides of the story", and the concern of employers
in this regard would be overcome.
Similarly, the union's concern about subtle and oppressive influence
would be partially alleviated by the "cold" nature of the communication. If
any "heat" did in fact exist, it would also be obvious to third parties, includ-
ing the Board. This approach has the added advantage of preventing disputes
over the actual contents of the statements should a violation of the Code be
alleged.
C. Ombudsman
One of the criticisms about existing restrictions that is often expressed
by employers is that the employees have no simple mechanism for becoming
aware of their rights. To a great extent, this is a legitimate concern. One
should never lose sight of the fact that one of the objectives of labour legis-
lation is the protection of the individual employee from not only the em-
ployer but also, in some cases, from the union. One of the cornerstones upon
which this protection must be built is the knowledge that individuals are
aware of their rights.
The Labour Boards in Canada have basically accepted the premise that
employers should not be party to this dissemination of information because
of their vested interest in the outcome of the organizational drive. The unions
also have vested interests that may be contrary to the wishes of individual
employees. What is required is a mechanism that ensures the employees are
aware not only of their basic rights, but also of the limits within 'which they
may exercise their freedom of choice. This is perhaps a responsibility for a
Labour Ombudsman 0 2 to whom all employees could be referred in the event
of an organizational drive by a trade-union. By law, a notice could be posted
advising employees of their basic rights and providing the means of getting
in contact with the Ombudsman. The employer in the event of questioning
could then be limited to merely advising the employees of this method of
obtaining correct information as to their legal rights.
1
0 2 Ss. 128-33 of the B.C. Code (not yet proclaimed into law) establishes the
office of Labour Ombudsman.
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